Friday, 27 May 2011

Dismissal for Petty Theft


Shrinkage due to theft by employees, particularly within the retail industry, remains a persistent and prevalent problem. It can, if not dealt with in an appropriate manner, be the death knell of a business. Consequently, dismissal for theft, unauthorized consumption and or unauthorized removal or possession of property remains one of the major reasons for dismissal within South Africa. 

In this post, I will look at a number of principles or factors that should be considered by employers when deciding whether or not to dismiss an employee for petty theft and in the event that they do, what evidence they should produce, should the employee challenge their dismissal.

In understanding what petty theft is, I include theft, unauthorized possession and or removal of property belonging to the employer, which is of minimal or negligible value. 

Assuming that you can prove that the employee is guilty, the following factors need to be considered.

1.  It seems that our law draws no meaningful distinction between acts of theft and cases of unauthorized possession or unauthorized removal of property for the purposes of evaluating the fairness of the sanction of dismissal. Theft is a very specific offense and you are required to prove the intent to permanently deprive the owner of ownership of the item in question. It is not always easy to prove such intent. That is why I recommend that the employer implement very specific rules relating to the possession and or removal of company property. If an employee breaches such a rule, it is not necessary to prove that he or she had the intent to steal. All you need prove is that the employee is in possession of the property or has consumed the property in circumstances when he or she should not have been in possession or consumed the property. The reason why little, if any, distinction is drawn between theft and unauthorized possession or removal is that rules relating to the latter are implemented to prevent the former and, therefore, breaches of these types of rules are seen in a serious light. It should be noted, however, that these rules and or procedures should be clear, they should be designed to prevent theft, they should be clearly communicated to employees and employees should be warned that they may be dismissed if they breach these rules.  

2.  Employers must be aware that in assessing whether or not to dismiss an employee for petty theft, they may not merely rely on the fact that an employee has or has attempted to remove company property. It has become increasingly clear that all relevant circumstances must be taken into account when assessing what a fair sanction is in the circumstances. What is relevant and in what way it is relevant will be discussed below. 

3. The first factor that may play a part is the value of the item. There are conflicting decisions as to whether the value of the item in question is a factor to be considered in evaluating the fairness of a disciplinary sanction. It seems that the position is that the value of the item in question carries little or no weight in the assessment process (see De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & Others  for example). However, the reality is that many arbitrators as well as some judges do consider the value of the item as being significant.

4.  There is also the question of the employees’ length of service and disciplinary record. It stands to reason that a person’s disciplinary record is always relevant in determining the issue of sanction. However what if the employee is, for example, caught eating a pie and she has a clean disciplinary record. Does this mean that you should not dismiss? No. The vast majority of decided cases have held that you can dismiss for petty theft even if this is the employee’s first offence. However, I would suggest that at least one of two factors have to be present where there is a clean service record. If either the trust relationship has been irreparably broken or the circumstances sustain the contention that the employee is unlikely to reform to his or her conduct in the future there is due motive for a dismissal despite a clean service record.

What about length of service? Although many consider length of service to constitute a mitigating factor in and of itself, I believe that this is incorrect. In De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & Others the LAC said that length of service is only material, which can support the contention that the employee’s actions were anomalous and it is unlikely to be repeated. Thus where an employee has a significant period of service and a clean disciplinary record, an inference may be drawn that the incident was a ‘once off’ and is unlikely to be repeated. However, there may be other factors present that may negate or prevent such an inference from being drawn. One of these factors is discussed below. Another factor may be that the nature of the business and or of the employee’s position may be such that you cannot take a risk that the offence may be repeated. For example, where the employee is a security guard or is the financial director.



5.  Whether the employee acknowledges his or her wrongdoing or denies that he or she is guilty is an important factor to consider. In a number of cases it has been held that the fact that an employee has created a mendacious account of what occurred and or where he or she denies that he or she is guilty, the presence of such factors strongly supports the contention that dismissal is appropriate (see Miyambo v CCMA & Others  and Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others for example). This is so because firstly a person who refuses to acknowledge their wrongdoing is unlikely to reform their conduct and secondly by denying their wrongdoing, they compound their initial dishonesty and demonstrate a dishonest disposition.

6. I also suggest that the nature of the employee’s job and their duties and responsibilities also are important factors. If the employee were in a position where trust is particularly important, this would support the contention that dismissal is appropriate. However, this does not mean that if an employee is not in a position where trust is of particular importance, that dismissal would not be appropriate.

7.    The circumstances in which the petty theft occurred may also be of importance. If, for example, an employer has been suffering shrinkage or has a shrinkage problem at the time of the offence or indeed prior to the offence, this would serve to justify taking strict action against employees who engage in petty theft. If an employer has a ‘zero tolerance’ policy, it is advisable to provide reasons at arbitration as to why such a policy is necessary. Prevention of shrinkage is such a reason and this reason would have even more resonance if the employer has or is suffering shrinkage.

8.   Lastly I would say that the impact of the misconduct on the trust relationship is the most important factor. It is true that by the very nature of dishonesty, when an employee steals or attempts to steal, there is a significant impact on the trust relationship. However, it is not sufficient merely to boldly allege that the trust relationship has broken down. I would suggest that, if you are seeking to justify a dismissal for theft at arbitration, you explain why the trust relationship has broken down. It is particularly important that you call the employee’s immediate superior to come and give evidence that he or she no longer trusts the employee to carry out their duties.

This post is for informational purposes only and is not intended to substitute for legal advice. It is strongly recommended that you seek advice before instituting disciplinary action against an employee for petty theft and or presenting a case before the relevant tribunal. The writer of this post does not accept any responsibility of whatsoever nature for any consequences that may follow from relying on the contents of this post.

Grant Ray-Howett

Tuesday, 3 May 2011

When is a secondary strike protected?

In SALGA v South African Municipal Workers Union (http://www.justice.gov.za/labourcourt/jdgm-lbac/lbac2011.htm), the Labour Appeal Court for the first time considered the meaning of section 66(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 ( as amended).

Section 66 (2) of the LRA provides that, a person may participate in a secondary strike if the primary strike complies with the requirements of the LRA, that a written notice has been given to the relevant party in terms of section 66(2)(b) and 'the nature and extent of a secondary strike is reasonable in relation to the posible direct or indirect effect that the secondary strike may have on the business of the primary employer'. It was the meaning of this last requirement that was at the heart of the matter in the SALGA judgement.

However before we deal with this decision, it may be useful for laypersons to understand the difference between a primary and secondary strike. This is perhaps best illustrated by way of an example. Lets imagine that the members of union X go on strike against VW South Africa in order to compel the employer to give into a wage demand. Sometime later, union X calls for a strike at Michelin Tyre manufactures who supply tires to VW in order to compel VW to give in to their wage demands. The withholding of labour in respect of VW would constitute the primary strike. The withholding of labour in respect of Michelin Tyres would constitute the secondary strike. A secondary strike should also be distinguished from a sympathy strike. In the case of the former, the purpose of the strike is by impacting on the business of the secondary employer to effect a impact on the business of the primary employer with the purpose of compelling the primary employer to give into the demands of the union involved in the primary strike. In the case of the latter, no such effect is necessary. The purpose of a sympathy strike is simply to voice support for another strike.

In SALGA v SAMWU matter, the material facts were as follows. The respondent trade union SAMWU was engaged in strike in respect of National Goverment. It then gave notice that it sought to enagage in a secondary strike at municipal level in support of its primary strike. SALGA then brought an application before the Labour Court to inderdict the secondary strike on the basis that inter alia, the proposed secondary strike at Municipal level would have no effect on the National Goverment and that therefore the requirment as per section 66(2)(c) has not been met. Essentially SALAG's position what the the secondary strike was not reasonable. The court a quo ( the Labour Court ), per Van Niekerk AJ as he then was disagreed and found that the proposed strike did comply with the requirments of section 66 (2)(c) ( See SALGA v SAMWU [2008] 1 BLLR 66 (LC) ).  SALA then appealed against the decision to the Labour Appeal Court.


On appeal, the LAC upheld the decision of the LAC. However in comming to its decision, the court per Waglay, JA made the following points:

1. The test as per section 66(2)(c) of the LRA is a proportionality test. That is to say that the effect or potential effect on the buisness of the primary employer must be proportionate to the harm caused to the buinsess of the secondary employer. The court said that:
' Under the head of proportionality, the court must weigh the effect of the
secondary strike on the secondary employer and the effect of the nature and
extent of the secondary strike on the business of the primary employer. The
sub-section does not require actual harm to be suffered by the primary
employer but that there must be the possibility that it may. The harm that the
employer may suffer is not required to be direct. It may be harm that indirectly7
affects the business of the primary employer. It would, therefore, in every
case require a factual inquiry to determine whether or not the possible effect
the secondary strike will have on the business of the primary employer is
reasonable. The harm that may be suffered by the secondary employer must
be proportional to the possible effect the secondary strike  may  have on the
business of the primary employer.'

This finding was significant because prior to the decision by the LC in this matter, the courts had rejected a proportionality approach to section 66(2)(c). The decision by the LAC now clarifies the position in that it has endorsed a proportional approach.

2. SALGA argued that in order for the strike to be protected as a secondary strike, it must aim to put pressure on the secondary employer who will in turn pressurise the primary employer into giving in to the demands in question. This arguement was rejected by the court. The LAC said that all that was required is that the secondary stikers must show that thier strike may have a direct or indirect effect on the buisness of the primary employer. That is to say the reasonablness of the strike is not measured against the capacity of the secondary employer to infleunce the primary employer.

3. Local Goverment is sufficiently integrated with National Goverment and that as Local Goverment provides various support and services to Provincial and National Goverment, a strike a local goverment level may potentiay have an impact on the operations of the Provincial and National Goverment.


Please note that the above post was for informational purposes only. The author of the post does not accept liability resulting from the use of this information. Anyone who is faced with a secondary strike must seek the opinion of the appropriate professional.


Grant Ray-Howett.